After a crisis, broad and sweeping reforms are enacted to restore trust. Following the [2007][2008] Great Financial Crisis, the European Union has engaged in an ambitious overhaul of banking regulation. One of its centerpieces, the 2013 Fourth Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV), tackles, amongst other things, the perceived pre-crisis failings in the governance of banks. We focus on the provisions that are aimed at reshaping bank boards' composition, functioning, and their members' liabilities, and argue that they are unlikely to improve bank boards' effectiveness or prevent excessive risk-taking. We criticize some of them for mandating solutions, like board diversity and the separation of chairman and CEO, that may be good for some banks but are bad for others, in the absence of any convincing argument that their overall effect is positive. We also criticize enhanced board liability by showing that it may increase the risk of herd behavior and lead to more serious harm in the event of managerial mistakes. We also highlight that the push towards unfriendly boards will negatively affect board dynamics and make boards as dysfunctional as when the CEO dominates them. We further argue that limits on directorships and diversity requirements will worsen the shortage of bank directors, while requirements for induction and training and board evaluation exercises will more likely lead to tick-the-box exercises than under the current situation in which they are just best practices. We conclude that European policymakers and supervisors should avoid using a heavy hand, respectively, when issuing rules implementing CRD IV provisions with regard to bank boards and when enforcing them.
INTRODUCTION
After corporate scandals hit or, even worse, a full-blown financial crisis materializes, policymakers take measures to "restore trust" and prevent further scandals or crises from happening. 1 Whether the laws enacted in such circumstances bring about overdue changes to an inadequate legal framework or are rather the innocuous or even detrimental product of political posturing is debated.
In the following, we focus on such rules and argue that they are meritless or even counterproductive for the governance of European banks. 26 We criticize some of them for mandating solutions, like board diversity and the separation of chairman and CEO, that may be good for some banks but are bad for others in the absence of any convincing argument that their overall effect is positive. We also criticize enhanced board liability by showing that it may increase the risk of herd behavior and lead to more serious harm in the event of managerial mistakes. We also highlight that the push towards unfriendly boards will negatively affect board dynamics and make boards as dysfunctional as when the CEO dominates them. We further argue that limits on directorships and diversity requirements will worsen the shortage of bank directors, while requirements for induction and training and board evaluation exercises will more likely lead to tick-the-box exercises than under the current situation in which they are just best practices.
While we do not cover each and every one of the provisions on bank boards in the CRD IV, 27 our scope is so wide-ranging as not to justify the criticism that we have cherrypicked provisions we do not like. 28 Those who like the quack corporate governance metaphor will find familiar traits in the provisions we discuss. Those who do not like the characterization of post-crisis reforms as quackery may in turn acknowledge that post-crisis lawmakers can easily err on the side of doing too much, and, while rejecting the metaphor, possibly concur with us that the CRD IV board rules are unjustified on their merits.
We are willing to acknowledge that any reform is an easy target for criticism and that a negative judgment of the new rules is only justified if (1) the status quo ante can be shown to have been better than the new regulatory framework, or (2) an alternative solution is shown to be superior to the one criticized. Throughout this Article, our criticism rests upon the former argument, i.e., that the status quo ante (a world without the rules we criticize) was superior to the new setting. 24 CRD IV, art. 91(9). 25 CRD IV, art. 88(2). 26 Needless to say, our focus is exclusively on bank governance, which has its own special features. See Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Röell, Why Bank Governance Is Different, 27 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 437, 444-57 (2011) . We leave the question open as to whether the rules we criticize would make better sense in nonfinancial corporations, although we doubt, as a general matter, that that could be the case, if only because banks' special features may warrant more intrusive governance regulation rather than less. 27 Specifically, we do not cover rules requiring banks to set up a risk management committee at the board level. See CRD IV, art. 76(3). Neither do we take issue with the provisions outlining a bank management body's functions and the requirement (for larger banks) to set up a nomination committee. See CRD IV, art. 88. Finally, we leave rules on executive remuneration, CRD IV arts. 92-96, for a future project. 28 See Prentice & Spence, supra note , at 1855 (criticizing Roberta Romano's critique of the SarbanesOxley Act, Romano, supra note 3, along those lines).
Like previous articles criticizing quack corporate governance, 29 we tend to give weight to the new provisions' inconsistency with the available empirical evidence. To be sure, pre-crisis empirical analyses, or even those based on data gathered during the crisis, no matter how accurate and reliable they are, tell us little about the post-crisis world in which banks have been operating and policymakers have legislated. 30 Further, for policy measures that are unprecedented, previous empirical studies can only look at different market participants' freely chosen behavior (e.g., the separation of chair and CEO functions); they cannot tell us what the effects would be of imposing that specific behavior on all banks. Hence, it would be admittedly impossible to find compelling empirical evidence in favor of the new measures.
However, despite the (perceived or real) limited value of finance and corporate governance empirical findings, we do cite amply from that literature, because such studies provide us with convincing intuitions as to why mandatory laws resulting in one-size-fits-all solutions may lead to suboptimal outcomes.
In Parts I and II we develop our criticism of the bank board measures listed above.
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Part I deals with provisions aimed at eradicating CEO-dominated boards, i.e., diversity requirements and enhanced board members' duties and liabilities. Part II discusses provisions petrifying current trends in boardroom best practices (separation of chair and CEO, rules setting limits on directorships, and those requiring induction programs and self-evaluation exercises). Part III concludes that the CRD IV governance rules are unlikely to improve the functioning of bank boards. Policymakers appear to have deployed these measures, together with the many others that have been taken during and after the crisis, to demonstrate their political commitment to do "whatever it takes" to restore trust in banks. We admit that this trust restoration effect may have been helpful in dealing with the crisis; in fact, we are not aware of any acceptable method to falsify that claim. In light of that possibility, instead of concluding that the various provisions we criticize should be repealed, we argue that implementing legislation should avoid further ratcheting up the new board rules' intensity and that banking supervisors should refrain from prioritizing enforcement of the new governance rules in their day-to-day supervisory activity. 29 See Romano, supra note 3, at 1529-43. 30 The crisis itself has made the environment totally different from the pre-crisis world or the middleof-the-crisis one: correlations (or absence thereof) that were to be found before the crisis might well be hard to replicate in its wake, because all market participants' behavior has changed in response to the game-changing events they have gone through. 31 We categorize them under two broad headings, not because each of the measures is exclusively characterized either way, but rather because of a predominance of one of the two features in explaining why we deem the measure to be misguided.
I. OVERCOMING FRIENDLY BOARDS
Like many corporate governance initiatives in the last three decades, the CRD IV seeks to eradicate the CEO-captured, "group-thinking" board and to replace it with an independent and critical "monitoring" board. 32 This goal is made explicit in article 88(2)(d) of the CRD IV, which sets as one of the nomination committee's tasks that of "ensur[ing] that the management body's decision making is not dominated by any one individual or small group of individuals in a manner that is detrimental to the interests of the institution as a whole."
Similarly, bank boards' legislation was enacted on the premise that "lack of monitoring by management bodies of management decisions . . . [before the crisis was] partly due to the phenomenon of 'groupthink.'"
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The CRD IV aims at strengthening the monitoring role of the board mainly in two ways: first, by imposing composition requirements in the form of diversity mandates; second, by tightening board members' duties and liabilities. We discuss mandated diversity and tighter board duties separately, highlighting the drawbacks of each of these tools in the next two Sections. The final Section questions, in turn, the wisdom of the goal itself of these two measures, i.e., the idea that more independent and, by implication, more confrontational boards are unequivocally better for individual banks and generally for financial stability.
A. Board Diversity
In its Preamble, the CRD IV explains that one of the causes of groupthink 34 is "lack of diversity" within the board. 35 Based on the assumption that more diverse boards will monitor management more effectively and therefore contribute to improved risk oversight and banks' resilience, the CRD IV imposes diversity as one of the criteria for board composition. In particular, banks and their nomination committees are required "to engage a broad set of qualities and competences when recruiting members to the management body and for that purpose to put in place a policy promoting diversity on the management body."
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Banks must publicly disclose their diversity policy as well as key diversity figures.
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National banking regulators shall collect information on, and benchmark, diversity practices; be taken into account for the selection" of board members. 38 Accordingly, under article 88(2)(a) of the CRD IV, the nomination committee shall, inter alia, "evaluate the balance of knowledge, skills, diversity and experience of the management body and prepare a description of the roles and capabilities for a particular appointment, and assess the time commitment expected." Furthermore, the nomination committee shall decide on a target for the representation of the underrepresented gender in the management body and prepare a policy on how to increase the number of the underrepresented gender in the management body in order to meet that target. The target, policy and its implementation shall be made public.
Diversity is itself a diverse concept, which includes social background, gender, age, race, nationality, and residency. 39 While the diversity requirement in the CRD's text is about more than gender equality, gender equality is emphasized by the requirement to set a gender target as well as in the (non-binding) Preamble. 40 That is why we focus more on gender diversity in the following.
Let us clarify at the outset that we do not argue against gender balance or diversity per se, but rather against a legal requirement (as opposed to a social norm and/or a mere best practice) for diversity in bank boards. We are willing to concede that lack of diversity mandates could preserve male dominance of boards. However, we do not discuss diversity as a broader social goal here, but rather look at it through the CRD IV prism and hence exclusively with its goal of enhancing banks' stability in mind.
Some empirical studies claim that board diversity is "universally good" for all firms; 41 139-40 (2013) (arguing that "the unique governance issues that result from including growth in the corporate governance discussion are part of a complex, three-dimensional continuum, wherein each of the dimensions (managerial control, longterm commitments and growth) are intertwined and constantly evolving," and concluding that strongassigned to the board (women with top education having a positive impact on the firm). 49 To conclude, the ability of diverse boards to influence banks' performance and risk-taking is highly contingent on the specific circumstances of each bank and of each market for bank directorships. 50 Whether the net effect of a diversity requirement will be positive is impossible to tell. If the ideal diversity quota is highly firm-specific, it is more likely that the board rather than a regulator knows whether diversity is beneficial, and which diversity quota if any is best for the firm.
Supporters of CRD IV diversity rules may counter that a higher presence of women on the board will ensure lower risk-taking across the board, and hence be instrumental to overall financial stability. Some (but not all) influential nonacademic publications stress this argument. 51 One explanation for the risk reduction thesis refers to groupthink in all-male boards: homogenous groups apply homogenous problem-solving strategies. The greater heterogeneity of boards with female representation reduces the likelihood of "groupthink"
errors. 52 Another argument relies on the overconfidence hypothesis; overconfident male directors paired with more cautious female board members achieve balanced board decisions.
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Academic studies testing the risk-reduction argument yield inconclusive results.
Some empirical studies do find a correlation between gender composition and risk. For growth firms benefit from club-like board structures while mature businesses benefit from diverse boards). 49 affect shareholders, employees and other stakeholders: presumably, board members will take into account those interests and, at least in contexts where shareholder welfare considerations prevail, may well make less risk-averse decisions than they would if they had to decide for themselves. Finally, the empirical evidence on women's risk aversion in investing is mixed, 61 and, interestingly, unfavorable in studies, like Adams and Funk's, 62 focusing on female directors or top managers as opposed to women in general. For example, with regard to executives, Iqbal Iqbal, Sewan O and H. Young Baek find that female executives engage in less diversification-related stock sales than male executives, which appears to be inconsistent with the claim that women are more risk-averse. 63 Even assuming that female directors are more risk-averse than male directors, gender may not be the ultimate explanation for this. Ann Marie Hibbert, Edward Lawrence and Arun
Prakash explain the reported risk aversion with the lower level of women's education as compared to men's. 64 In light of past gender discrimination within the corporate world, a lower level of risk could in fact reflect lesser (risk) management experience in gender-diverse boards, given that practical experience with risk management helps build up board members'
confidence that risks can be controlled and managed. The lower-risk effect of female board membership would then vanish when societies achieve the desirable state of gender equality at the top of financial (and nonfinancial) firms. In any event, we would tend to reject the idea that regulators have meant to exploit female board members' lower level of education and/or experience to reduce the overall risks banks take, while at the same time emphasizing expertise as a requirement for board members. 65 Supporters of diversity could finally emphasize the role of individual banks' implementation choices: the board itself or its nomination committee, the argument could go, is to set the bank-specific diversity policy and can consider each bank's peculiarities accordingly. Despite the vague wording, the political expectation is crystal clear. In light of the required disclosure of each bank's diversity policy, the screening of diversity practices by national regulators, and the harmonizing character of the forthcoming EBA guidelines, 66 it is almost carved in stone that each bank sets a diversity threshold in the mid-range of the political expectations, even where such an approach may prove harmful for that bank.
B. Enhanced Board Members' Duties and Liabilities
Throughout the crisis, spectacular bank collapses have been followed by enforcement actors'
statements that there would be no viable liability claim against directors (and officers) for breach of their duties. 67 Hence, the conviction, often expressed by commentators, that legal systems are too benevolent vis-à-vis faulty bankers. 68 In 2010, the European Commission launched a consultation on the corporate governance of financial institutions, in which it also asked market participants to comment on a generic proposal to move in the direction of strengthening bank director civil and criminal liability. implies that a bank has a precise duty to remove a director who fails to comply with its prescriptions. At the same time, individual board members breaching those duties will be subject to administrative penalties of significant size (up to €5,000,000 or double the loss incurred as a consequence of the violation 73 ) and to be made public unless that is disproportionate.
74
To understand why the provisions on directors' duties and administrative penalties will seriously increase their liability risk, consider that, after a managerial decision proves harmful to the bank, the banking supervisor may easily find that a violation of the duty to effectively challenge management decisions had occurred: hindsight bias easily leads to a finding that a director negligently failed to challenge a managerial decision, if it proves harmful to the bank. It would be surprising if banking supervisors, in the new post-crisis environment of "heavy-touch" regulation and enforcement, were reluctant to find directors in breach of the duties specified in article 91(8) of the CRD IV. Given that banking supervisors have all the evidence ready at hand due to the banks' reporting obligations and the supervisor's access to all internal documents, enforcement on their part is easy and likely.
The new duties may also affect civil liability regimes, especially in countries where the standards courts deploy to judge directors' liability are already much stricter than Delaware-style Caremark duties. 75 For instance, Italian and German courts hold outside directors and supervisory board members, respectively, liable even for negligently failing to 72 We note in passing that the CRD IV-enhanced director duties appear to be much more broadly framed and to have a much wider scope of application than the enhanced duty of oversight recently advocated by John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and the Limits of Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 64-74 (2014) While the CRD IV's wording may cover any kind of negligent board members' behavior at any European bank or investment firm, Armour and Gordon propose a more focused obligation to "oversee systems to assess potential downside consequences of the firm's business strategies and to factor these into its decision-making appropriately" with specific regard to certain business matters, id. First of all, there will be instances in which the board will have to decide either to do things as is best practice, state of the art, widely held to be the best course of action -in a word, as the herd would do it -or to try something new and/or different. If risk of (civil or administrative) liability for board business decisions (and failure to challenge them) is real, which course of action will directors prefer? Of course, it will be the easier one to justify ex post, i.e., the one that follows in the rest of the industry's footsteps. Ironically, few disagree with the proposition that bank managements' herd behavior was one of the catalysts of the financial crisis. 80 Second, an increased (civil or administrative) liability risk may lead to a stronger tendency to stick to the previously chosen course of action, no matter whether the board had made the decision or just failed to object to it as soon as it was informed about it. Even once a decision is shown to be questionable, a change of strategy or anyhow abandoning the chosen path may highlight that previous decisions or omissions were wrong/harmful and hence immediately intensify the risk of liability. 81 Sticking to previous choices and waiting for better times will at least delay the day of reckoning. In the best case scenario, i.e., if favorable changes in the circumstances occur, lucky boards avoid it altogether. That is why staying put may be better than promptly reacting to previous mistakes, even though, should things go wrong, directors may face increased liability for acquiescing to those mistakes. 82 To conclude, enhanced board duties will increase liability risk, especially in the European context where the business judgment rule does not insulate directors from the consequences of managerial mistakes. That, in turn, increases banks' tendency to do things as others in the industry do them, i.e., herd behavior. Finally, it makes it less likely that managerial mistakes will be timely corrected.
C. The Downside of Mandating Unfriendly Boards
Diversity requirements and enhanced director duties (chief among these, the duty to challenge management decisions with independence of mind) are aimed at strengthening the role of banks' boards as an effective and critical monitor of top management. In the decades prior to the financial crisis, the policy tool to attain that objective for public corporations more generally was a push toward more formally independent boards, i.e., boards in which a given portion of directors had no ties with executive directors or other insiders. 83 A policy shift has thus occurred in the banking regulation area 84 : from formal independence to independence of mind as proxied by individual board members' diverse traits and reinforced by the threat of civil and administrative sanctions in the event of passive behavior.
Such a shift is also the product of empirical evidence failing to show a positive correlation (or even finding a negative one) between board independence and various measures of banks' performance, before and during the crisis. 85 The literature tends to explain those empirical findings with the lack of firm-specific knowledge that formal independence implies.
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But an alternative explanation may well be that more inquisitiveness within the boardroom creates countervailing problems that make unfriendly boards no more effective than ones dominated by CEOs. A more confrontational and less trustful atmosphere within the boardroom can lead CEOs to provide less information to boards, to seek less advice from the board itself, and to incur higher influence costs vis-à-vis informationally distant board members. 87 In practice, they will find ways to communicate outside the board with those members that do not make trouble, selectively disclosing information to them and prearranging majorities to mute discussion within the boardroom. Such a course of action will lead to even more confrontational behavior on the part of dissident board members. showing that cognitive conflict is positive for board dynamics and providing empirical findings in support of the view that board effort and cognitive conflict are positively correlated with (nonfinancial) firms' lower risk exposure. However, their findings deal with norm-induced cognitive conflicts and board effort (in other words, they hold regulation constant and hence look into differences at firm level, which can only be voluntary). They do not (and in fact could not) show that law-induced cognitive conflict will lead to the same result.).
Of course, the CRD IV's emphasis on board members' expertise 88 and the requirement for induction programs 89 may reduce information asymmetries within the board and, hence, the risk of negative board dynamics. But the information gap between outside directors and insiders is bound to remain huge no matter how well-trained and expert board members are. We have just preconized that diversity requirements and the newly spelt-out director duties will lead to a genuinely more confrontational style of board interactions. But at banks where insiders can influence the nomination process, a different kind of board dynamics may well be the outcome of E.U. lawmakers' attempt to impose independence of mind within boardrooms.
First, banks may comply with diversity requirements in form but not in substance, by systematically choosing less skilled, less active and less assertive members with a diverse background. In that case, diversity requirements will be used strategically to obtain no less friendly boards than without them. Second, because violations of the duty of independence may lead to an administrative penalty for the bank itself, it will be the direct responsibility of the compliance officer (or the company's secretary) to ensure that evidence will be available of a vibrant discussion within the board and of directors' inquisitiveness. Members of a friendly, cohesive board, possibly working effectively with the bank's top management, will have to pretend to be asking tough questions and appear to be confrontational so as to avoid being fined as weak CEO puppets. When mere appearance is the outcome, it will be a matter neither of formal nor of substantial independence. In such cases, theatrical (in fact, farcical)
independence is all that attempts to impose independence of mind can achieve. We leave it to the reader to judge whether any benefits can stem from this kind of board dynamics, while noting that the opportunity costs of playing the farce and documenting it are, if not substantial, at least hard to dispute.
To conclude, the CRD IV's push towards unfriendly boards may prove counterproductive. It may lead to excessive emphasis on informational and procedural issues to the detriment of sound business judgment as well as to reduced information flows and discussion quality at the board level. As an outcome, bank governance will be weakened rather than strengthened.
II. PETRIFYING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TRENDS
In this Part we show that some CRD IV governance provisions reflect current trends in boardroom best practices. When practices become law, they take on the standardizing, onesize-fits-all character of regulation. Also, the current best practices as described in member 88 See supra note 65. 89 See infra Section II.C.
states' corporate governance codes are perpetuated and experimentation is precluded or at least hindered. This "petrification effect" reduces banks' ability to adapt to change. In turn, as with the diversity requirement, those banks for which already the best practice standards are not suitable are left with suboptimal board rules.
We provide three examples of our petrification claim in this Part: the separation of chairman and CEO (Section A), limits on directorships (Section B), as well as mandatory induction and self-evaluation (Section C). We conclude with a side glance at who benefits from -and therefore may have pushed for -these types of rules (Section D).
A. Separation of Chairman and CEO
An increasing number of listed companies in the United States have separated the roles of board chair and CEO in the last twenty years, a practice that has for long been very common in the United Kingdom. 90 The commonly held view among corporate governance reformers is that it will be harder for an imperial CEO to dominate the board if someone else chairs it. In other words, the board can more effectively monitor the CEO with a separate chair. 91 Post-crisis policy papers on bank governance reform put this topic forward as one deserving of policymakers' attention. 92 However, they have tended not to recommend mandatory separation of the two roles, recognizing that "a one size fits all approach is difficult in this area." 93 Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act went no further than directing the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to impose disclosure on why the board has chosen CEO-chair duality or separated the two roles. 94 The CRD IV has gone much further in the direction of nudging companies into separating the two roles. According to article 88(1)(e), "the chairman of the management body in its supervisory function of an institution must not exercise simultaneously the functions of a chief executive officer within the same institution, unless justified by the institution and authorized by competent authorities." This provision appears to be an extremely sticky default in favor of separating the two roles.
The reason why most banks can be expected to stick to it instead of filing a request for an authorization to do otherwise is twofold. First, each bank has a limited reserve of political capital that it can deploy with supervisory agencies. Only in exceptional circumstances can they be expected to spend it to persuade the banking supervisor into authorizing duality. Second, once the lawmaker has clearly indicated a preference for separation, it is politically riskier for the supervisor to authorize duality than to reject the bank's request. In fact, the bank may later flourish or fail. In the latter case, should it fail with a chairman-CEO that had been previously authorized, the chances are high that someone will put two and two together and blame the supervisor for allowing duality. If the request for a derogation from separation of the two roles had been rejected, it is much less likely that anyone would connect the two facts, because separation will be seen as normal. Needless to say, in either case failure may well have nothing to do with duality or separation, but what counts is the risk that the media and policy entrepreneurs will make the connection and criticize the supervisor.
How justified is the new sticky default in favor of separation? The number of studies, theoretical and especially empirical, delving into the question whether separation is more efficient than duality is huge, but the evidence is inconclusive at best: neither theory nor empirical studies have come to firm conclusions on whether firms are better governed either way. 95 Studies specifically addressing banks and searching for correlations between duality/separation and performance or risk-taking have found little evidence of any such correlations. 96 There are good, intuitive reasons for letting companies make their own determinations whether the two roles should be combined or separate. In short, "the implications of CEO duality are a function of firm-specific costs and benefits." 97 How beneficial separation of the two functions is for an individual bank depends on a number of features, including whether the CEO's incentives are aligned with her principals' interests, via compensation or share ownership, how independent and effective other board members are in monitoring the CEO, and whether the CEO has already built a good reputation. 98 The costs of separating the two roles similarly vary as a function of numerous variables: the same factors affecting the benefits of separation will lead to variations in the cost of monitoring the separate chairman. 99 Whether separation leads to rivalries and confusion regarding who is in charge will depend on the personalities involved. 100 The organizational complexity of the bank will affect how costly it is for the CEO to share information with the chairman. 101 Further, internal board dynamics may or may not lead to confusion regarding who is to blame for mismanagement 102 and may affect other directors' tendency to monitor less and rely instead on the separate chair to do the monitoring. 103 Finally, banks doing business in a highly uncertain and fast-changing environment will put a premium on unity of command, because this allows for speed of decision-making. 104 For such banks (i.e., for all banks in a financial crisis setting), the costs of separation will be higher.
Pushing all banks in the direction of separating the two functions can hardly be predicted to lead to their safer management: separation may (or may not) improve things at previously badly managed banks and worsen them at well-managed ones. There is neither a theoretical rationale nor available empirical evidence to suggest that the aggregate benefits from mandatory CEO-chair separation at badly managed banks will be higher than the costs attaching to it in well-run banks. Needless to say, arguing that in the absence of separation between the two roles the European banking system came to the verge of disaster simply would prove too much, also because CEO-chair duality was relatively uncommon in Europe on the eve of the crisis 105 and is nowadays even less so, at least among the largest banks. busyness and performance may fail to consider that, as one study shows, busy directors are more likely to be selected in companies in which the CEO has stronger control over the nomination process, 114 which in turn could mean, more generally, too much power. Excessive CEO power, rather than directors' busyness, may thus explain lower performance at those companies. 115 Nor would the correlation between CEO power and director busyness justify a limit on directorships as a tool to ensure that the CEO will have less power thanks to better monitoring: if the CEO has influence over the nomination process, she will likely manage to select equally ineffective and/or less visibly busy directors. When there is value in having a director with multiple directorships on board, 116 then imposing such a limit will have no benefits in terms of curbing the CEO's excessive power, while at the same time preventing the bank from gaining from the busy director's experience and connections.
B. Limits on Directorships
Consider also that limits on board seats are too blunt an instrument to ensure that board members will "commit sufficient time to perform their functions in the institution," as article 91 (2) In fact, the variance in the time needed to perform exactly the same board task by different individuals in any given institution is intuitively high. Depending also on how focused they are on their principal occupation, for some even a second directorship is too much to handle, for others an unnecessary constraint. In addition, introducing a limit on directorships exclusively for banks' boards 117 may well have the effect of segregating the market for bank directorships from the market for directorships in general: to avoid the limit, board(s), may simply decide not to accept bank directorships, an outcome that is at odds with the diversity requirement discussed in Section I.A.
C. Induction and Self-Evaluation
Our last target are two seemingly innocuous provisions that inscribe into law the practice of providing training and induction for new board members (article 91(9) of the CRD IV) and of periodic self-evaluation exercises (article 88(2)(b) of the CRD IV).
While neither of these requirements lacks common sense, their formalization into banking regulation may easily lead (smaller) banks hitherto lacking any formal induction program or self-evaluation practices to engage in standardized box-ticking exercisespossibly trumping informal (yet idiosyncratically effective and cost-efficient) tools -to train new directors and evaluate the board's performance. Similarly, the "juridification" of such best practices may lead banks with induction and self-assessment programs already in place to adapt such programs, or stick to the industry standards, even when those standards are not suited to them. In a recent paper criticizing risk management juridification, we have highlighted the reasons why embedding such a tool into the law entails pressure towards standardization. 118 The same reasons apply with regard to induction programs and selfevaluation practices.
In short, these requirements will have to be implemented in a verifiable way, i.e., it will have to be possible for the supervisor to understand how the bank has implemented these requirements and to check whether they are complied with in practice. The supervisory authority cannot be expected to have deep inside knowledge of the peculiarities of each and every individual bank: it will compare a firm's induction programs and self-assessment exercises with the standard ones it considers to be best practices. Any deviation or customization will imply additional supervisory effort, first to understand the contents of the idiosyncratic methods and then to assess whether they are acceptable/justified. A strong bias toward uniformity ensues: those who have already adopted industry standards will stick to them. Those with idiosyncratic programs had better replace them with standard ones. Once again, it may be the case that idiosyncratic programs perform on average worse than standard ones. But one wonders what theory could justify such a belief.
D. A Note: And the Winners Are…
Before concluding, it is worth asking in passing who benefits from "petrifying" governance rules such as those we have previously focused on, if banks and society as a whole are likely to suffer. Many of the CRD IV bank governance measures described here, and precisely the 118 Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 80, at 293. diversity requirements, the limits on directorships, and the rules imposing training and induction programs and self-evaluation exercises, will push up E.U. banks' demand for corporate governance consultancy services. Not only may banks, especially smaller ones, genuinely lack the skills and experience that are needed to comply with these new governance provisions, but it may also be convenient for them to demand such services to reduce the risk of failure to adequately implement the new governance measures: a consultant will be better aware of what the supervisor deems acceptable and adequate, so that banks may reasonably rely on its advice in adapting to the new rules.
Further, there will be tasks which any bank will find extremely convenient to outsource. It will be almost impossible, for example, to abide by the new board diversity requirements without the assistance of a headhunting firm. Recruitment services for banks' boards, in turn, will become more difficult to carry out than in the past. A suitable set of candidates will now have to have diverse backgrounds and complementary skills, 119 not to mention that limits on directorships will drain the pool of potential candidates. All of that will justify higher consultancy fees.
Finally, some of the very best practices that have been inscribed into law, namely training and induction programs and self-assessment exercises, are already carried out with the assistance of consultants. 120 For banks that have not formalized such programs and practices yet, it will only be natural to turn to consultants once induction, training and selfassessment become mandatory.
Hence, from the plethora of bank governance reforms that the European Union has been churning out, at least one clear winner emerges: corporate governance consultancy and recruitment services providers. They share the podium, of course, with policymakers and politicians who have shown to have done not just "something," but a lot, to restore trust, and bank supervisors, who have gained a wide range of regulatory and supervisory powers over banks' boards. These three groups together have enough clout to impose the rules we have focused on in this section even though they negatively affect banks and society as a whole.
III. CONCLUSION: SOFT IMPLEMENTATION AND UNDER-ENFORCEMENT AS

REGULATORY RESPONSES
Our analysis has covered the core bank board provisions in the CRD IV, arguing that they are meritless and counterproductive. First of all, we have shown how the diversity requirements 119 See CRD IV, art. 91(1) ("The overall composition of the management body shall reflect an adequately broad range of experiences."). 120 See and the newly spelt-out director duties, which are intended to overcome the problems of CEO-dominated boards and groupthink, may introduce problems of their own in the way boards perform their oversight and advisory functions. Second, various provisions petrify existing corporate governance best practices, and in so doing impose costs on banks that would be better off adopting (or maintaining) a different solution (such as a chairman/CEO or a board in which also a busy professional director with the right expertise keeps his seat).
Making induction and training and self-assessment exercises mandatory, finally, may easily lead to expensive and standardized box-ticking exercises, to the detriment of more customized solutions at the level of individual banks (and at sizeable benefit to governance consultants).
These governance rules do not live up to the principles of "good" or at least "better regulation," a standard to which the European Commission 121 and some of the European regulators have subscribed. In particular, the measures criticized herein lack proportionality, insofar as, with due exceptions, they apply to all bank boards -even those that are "best in
class." For most of them, there is no way to tell whether they will enhance efficiency and financial stability or have the opposite effect: their one-size-fits-all character only justifies the prediction that they may improve governance at some banks as likely as worsen it in others.
The problem is that there is no evidence whatsoever to predict that the net benefits will be positive, while the transition and implementation costs for all banks are certain.
Supporters of the CRD IV board rules could further argue that the costs of corporate governance rules are low compared to the overall size of financial markets and their relevance to society; hence, one should not worry about these small extra costs when so much is at stake. But this argument holds water only for large banks. Small and mid-size banks -whose competitive position already suffers from the lack of an implicit bailout option -suffer more from the fixed costs and the inflexibility of the board rules we have focused on. From a systemic perspective, it is these small and medium banks that should benefit from post-crisis legislation: these are the banks that can challenge the oligopolistic and moral hazard-prone equilibrium resting upon large, too-big-too-fail banks.
Despite these detrimental effects, the CRD IV board rules may nevertheless be praised for their trust-restoration effect. In fact, crisis regulation may be less about efficiency and proportionality, and more about short-term restoration of trust in the stability of financial markets. 122 The systemic positive effects on public confidence may outweigh the net negative effects at the level of individual firms: after all, if people stop keeping their money in bank accounts today we do not need to worry about banks' profitability tomorrow. So let us impose overly harsh measures today as a signal that we will do whatever it costs, and worry tomorrow about tomorrow. Put this way, quack provisions can be justified as trading off relatively low long-term costs for very high short-term benefits. We admit that this short-term signal may have been important in handling the crisis: given the little we know about crisis psychology, we cannot exclude that overly harsh, even useless or harmful measures effectively played a trust restoration role.
For this reason, Roberta Romano argued in favor of sunset provisions, i.e., confirmation of crisis legislation by Congress or Parliament after some years. 123 The problem with that idea is that legislation contingent on periodic review and confirmation does not credibly signal policymakers' commitment to restoring confidence. The same political entrepreneurs that drive crisis legislation would unmask legislation with a sunset provision as a strategic effort to mislead the public into thinking that lawmakers are serious about bank regulation. The lack of trust in financial markets and regulation would persist. Put differently,
